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Abstract
In this paper we develop a quantitative model of entrepreneurial activity (risk-taking) and
consumer bankruptcy choices and use the model to study the effects of bankruptcy regulations on
entrepreneurial activity, bankruptcy rate and welfare. We show that eliminating bankruptcy
exemptions leads to a modest increase in the fraction of entrepreneurs, a large decrease in the
overall bankruptcy rate and a signiﬁcant welfare gain. In contrast, eliminating the whole
consumer bankruptcy system leads to a large fall in the fraction of entrepreneurs and a substantial
welfare loss. These two ﬁndings suggest that the consumer bankruptcy system is desirable but it
must be well-designed with regard to bankruptcy asset exemptions. In particular, excessive
bankruptcy exemptions can be counter-productive. Finally, we argue that entrepreneurial activity
is important when studying different bankruptcy rules or regulations.
JEL classiﬁcation: D31, E21, J23
Bank classiﬁcation: Economic models; Financial stability; Financial system regulation and poli-
cies
Résumé
Les auteurs construisent un modèle quantitatif formalisant les choix des ménages quant à
l’entrepreneuriat (prise de risque) et à la faillite. Ce modèle leur permet d’étudier l’incidence des
règles de défaillance sur l’entrepreneuriat, le taux de faillite personnelle et le bien-être. Ils
montrent que l’abandon des dérogations prévues aux mesures de liquidation donne lieu à une
légère hausse de la proportion d’entrepreneurs, à une chute notable du taux global de faillite et à
un accroissement sensible du bien-être. À l’inverse, l’abolition de toute possibilité de recours à la
faillite personnelle réduit beaucoup la proportion d’entrepreneurs et le bien-être. Il ressort de ces
deux résultats que la procédure de faillite est un dispositif législatif utile, qui doit toutefois être
bien conçu en ce qui concerne les biens exemptés de saisie. En effet, des dérogations trop
généreuses peuvent être contre-productives. En conclusion, les auteurs soutiennent que l’étude
des lois et règlements relatifs à la faillite doit tenir compte du rôle important de l’entrepreneuriat.
Classiﬁcation JEL : D31, E21, J23
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Stabilité ﬁnancière; Réglementation et poli-
tiques relatives au système ﬁnancier1 Introduction
In this paper, we construct a quantitative model of entrepreneurship and consumer bankruptcy and
use the model to address the following question: what are the eﬀects of bankruptcy regulation on
entrepreneurship, bankruptcy rate and welfare? This is motivated by the following observations:
• Entrepreneurial activity is widely regarded as essential for innovation, capital accumulation,
and development.1
• The consumer bankruptcy data show that a substantial fraction of debtors in bankruptcy
under Chapter 7 of the U.S. bankruptcy code are entrepreneurs. Speciﬁcally, Sullivan, Warren,
and Westbrook (2000) and Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989) show that about 20% of
bankruptcy ﬁlings are accounted for by small businesses.
• A distinctive feature of bankrupt entrepreneurs is that they carry extremely large amounts of
unsecured debt. In fact, they account for more than half of all unsecured debt listed among
bankrupts.
• Entrepreneurs hold almost 3.5 times as much unsecured debt as non-entrepreneurs. Their
debt-to-income ratio is higher than that of non-entrepreneurs.
Despite these observations, the interaction between consumer bankruptcy and entrepreneurship
has received relatively little attention in quantitative macroeconomic models. In this paper, we
propose a quantitative model that is consistent with these facts and then use it to examine the eﬀects
of tightening bankruptcy rules on entrepreneurial activity, bankruptcy rate and welfare. Speciﬁcally,
we consider the elimination of bankruptcy asset exemptions (i.e., the level of household assets that
a debtor declaring bankruptcy can keep) and the elimination of the whole consumer bankruptcy
system.
We observe the presence of entrepreneurs in consumer bankruptcy because the U.S. personal
bankruptcy system, although designed for consumers, also functions as a bankruptcy system for
small businesses. When ﬁrms are noncorporate, debts of the ﬁrm are personal liabilities of the
entrepreneur-owner. If the business fails, the owner of the ﬁrm can declare personal bankruptcy
under Chapter 7, since both business and personal debts will be discharged.2 Small business owners
declaring bankruptcy under Chapter 7 must give up all assets they own in excess of a pre-determined
exemption level. However, all their future earnings are exempt from the obligation to repay pre-
bankruptcy debt and they can start new businesses and take new jobs—this is known as the “fresh
start” in bankruptcy.
The quantitative assessment of consumer bankruptcy laws on entrepreneurship and welfare en-
tails the evaluation of two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, in incomplete markets, the personal
1Entrepreneurship is an important component of the aggregate economy. See Haltiwanger and Krizan (1999) and
Bednarzik (2000) for the link between job growth and entrepreneurship, and Schumpeter (1934) and Banerjee and
Newman (1993) for the entrepreneurship-economic growth nexus. See Cagetti and de Nardi (2006), Quadrini (2000),
and Meh (2005) for entrepreneurship as an important factor in explaining wealth accumulation and its distribution.
2Personal bankruptcy law is also important for many small corporations that fail. This is because creditors frequently
demand personal guarantees from business owners, thus sidestepping the legal shield of an incorporated business.
1bankruptcy system, by giving both the option to discharge debt and to have bankruptcy asset ex-
emptions, provides partial insurance against business failure and job loss. Because entrepreneurship
is risky, this partial insurance allows business owners to smooth consumption across state and as a
result provides risk averse agents with incentives to undertake entrepreneurial activity.3 On the other
hand, ﬁnancial intermediaries charge a higher premium on borrowing to cover for default risks. To the
extent that ﬁnancial constraints exist, such high interest rates may discourage entrepreneurship and
limit the ability of households to smooth consumption across time. There is indeed evidence suggest-
ing that entrepreneurs face ﬁnancial constraints (Evans and Jovanovic (1989)) and that bankruptcy
makes it diﬃcult for entrepreneurs to get funding in U.S. states with generous exemptions (Berkowitz
and White (2004)). We denote the ﬁrst eﬀect, the insurance eﬀect and the second the credit supply
eﬀect. Evaluating the eﬀects of bankruptcy laws mainly involves assessing the trade-oﬀ between
the insurance and credit supply eﬀects. These eﬀects also exist with non-entrepreneurs, but with
entrepreneurs, there are direct implications for economic performance.
To conduct our quantitative analysis, we use an overlapping generation model of entrepreneurial
and bankruptcy choices that feature these two opposing eﬀects. Every period, households can choose
to undertake risky entrepreneurial activity or to be workers. Workers face uninsurable idiosyncratic
earnings shocks while entrepreneurs face not only earnings risks but also uninsurable idiosyncratic
investment risks. Entrepreneurial activity requires a minimum scale. Households can save with
a risk-free asset and borrow from competitive ﬁnancial intermediaries to smooth consumption, to
become entrepreneurs, and to increase the scale of their businesses. Borrowing entails a ﬁnancial
intermediation cost per unit of funds borrowed. Every period, we allow households (workers and
entrepreneurs) to choose to default on their non-contingent unsecured debts. The default choice is
modelled as a decision to ﬁle for personal bankruptcy under U.S. Chapter 7 where unsecured debts are
fully discharged in exchange for assets in excess of pre-determined exemptions. Naturally, this default
option leads ﬁnancial intermediaries to charge a default premium on loans to households. Following
Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and R´ ıos-Rull (2007) and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007), we
assume that when making loans, ﬁnancial intermediaries can observe a household’s current income,
occupation, level of business capital, savings, debt holdings and age. As a result, the equilibrium
price of loans to borrowers is a function of their current income, occupation, portfolio (savings and
business investment), age and level of debt.
Our quantitative model successfully replicates the above regularities on entrepreneurship and
bankruptcy. In particular, the model accounts for the extraordinarily high level of debt of en-
trepreneurs in bankruptcy, the high bankruptcy rate of entrepreneurs relative to workers, and the
high debt-to-income ratio of entrepreneurs relative to workers. The model also generates the hump-
shape proﬁle of the bankruptcy rate over the life-cycle. Given the success of our model in replicating
the data, we use it to conduct two policy experiments that are meant to capture the tightening
of bankruptcy rules as recently approved in the U.S. The ﬁrst policy experiment consists of the
elimination of the bankruptcy exemption. In such a case the only beneﬁt associated with declaring
bankruptcy is the full discharge of debt (the fresh start). The second policy reform is the elimination
of the entire bankruptcy system which implies that the default option is removed. We ﬁnd that elim-
3Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) provide evidence on risk in entrepreneurship.
2inating the bankruptcy exemption leads to an increase in the number of entrepreneurs, a decrease in
the bankruptcy rate, and most importantly a signiﬁcant welfare gain. The welfare gain comes from
the increase in entrepreneurial activity and the ability to better smooth consumption over time with
the decrease in interest rate. The credit supply eﬀect of the bankruptcy exemption thus dominates
the insurance eﬀect.
In contrast, eliminating the entire consumer bankruptcy system leads to a large decrease in
the number of entrepreneurs and a signiﬁcant welfare loss. The insurance eﬀect of the consumer
bankruptcy system is more valuable than the credit supply eﬀect and thus promotes entrepreneurship
and smoothes consumption across states. The fact that the bankruptcy exemption is welfare-reducing
while the whole bankruptcy system is welfare-improving provides a very clear message: the consumer
bankruptcy system is essential for its insurance role but must be well designed in the sense that
bankruptcy exemptions have to be low.
Another key ﬁnding of this paper is that entrepreneurial activity plays a central role in consumer
bankruptcy law analysis. When entrepreneurship is not explicitly modelled, the welfare implications
of bankruptcy regulations are small and may even have diﬀerent directions relative to an economy
in which entrepreneurial activity is accounted for. For example, in the model without entrepreneurs,
eliminating bankruptcy asset exemptions leads to a small welfare gain (0.024% of life time consump-
tion) while the welfare gain is large in the model with entrepreneurs (1.78%). With respect to the
elimination of the entire consumer bankruptcy system, the direction of the welfare eﬀects varies
depending on whether or not entrepreneurs are included in the economy. In contrast to the case
when entrepreneurs are considered, eliminating the entire consumer bankruptcy system in the model
without entrepreneurs increases welfare, although the welfare gain is relatively small. This result is
consistent with Athreya (2002) and also with Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2006) when there are
no expense shocks and only earnings shocks are present.
A number of recent papers have focused on studying the magnitude of the economic eﬀects of per-
sonal bankruptcy reform in quantitative dynamic equilibrium models (eg., Athreya (2001), Athreya
(2004), Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and R´ ıos-Rull (2007), Li and Sarte (2006), Livshits, MacGee,
and Tertilt (2006) These papers have, however, ignored entrepreneurship. As we have shown in this
paper, accounting for entrepreneurial activity is crucial for studying the determinants of bankruptcy
and for understanding the economic implications of bankruptcy policy. Chatterjee, Corbae, Naka-
jima, and R´ ıos-Rull (2007) make theoretical and quantitative contributions in a macroeconomic
model with a bankruptcy option in which prices of unsecured loans depend on loan size and house-
hold characteristics. They show that means-testing under Chapter 7 leads to large welfare gains.
Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2006) in a bankruptcy model with wage garnishment, illustrate the
importance of expense shocks and life-cycle eﬀects when comparing bankruptcy rules. Li and Sarte
(2006) consider aggregate production and the choice between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 and ﬁnd
that eliminating consumer bankruptcy and lowering the bankruptcy exemption increase welfare. In
their model, however, all households borrow at the same interest rate regardless of their type or the
amount borrowed. In contrast to Li and Sarte (2006), Athreya (2002), who also assumes a single
interest for all borrowers, ﬁnds that eliminating the bankruptcy system improves welfare. None of
these models account for entrepreneurial activity and the eﬀects of the consumer bankruptcy system
3on income through risk-taking.
Our paper is also related to an independent work of Akyol and Athreya (2007), who also study
bankruptcy with occupational choices. In their model, however, only entrepreneurs are allowed to ﬁle
for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 and workers are not. This is not only inconsistent with the data, but
it also substantially exaggerates the eﬀects of the bankruptcy asset exemption on entrepreneurship
and welfare. Another important feature of their framework that also contributes to exaggerate
the eﬀects of the bankruptcy exemption is that in their economy, only poor households with little
employment prospects move to entrepreneurship. This feature makes self-employment a disguised
form of unemployment and more sensitive to bankruptcy. In our work, on the other hand, individuals
with good employment prospects could decide to enter entrepreneurship if they have good business
ideas.
Our paper is related to several empirical studies of bankruptcy.4 Fan and White (2003) in their
probit analysis show that in states with high homestead exemptions (exemption of on housing equity
for homeowners), the probability of becoming self-employed is high. This result may, however, be
due to state-speciﬁc eﬀects such as tax laws, banking regulations, and geographical location. One
of their results that may support the case for state-speciﬁc eﬀects is that renters in these states
have also a high probability of becoming self-employed since renters do not home equity. Moreover,
given the reduced form approach of their analysis, they are unable to conduct a policy experiment.
Using cross-country analysis, Armour and Cumming (2005) argue that the tighter is the personal
bankruptcy law the lower is the self-employment rate across countries. For instance, they ﬁnd that
a ten-year reduction in the time to discharge unsecured debt increases self-employment rates by
approximately 1.5%in the countries considered. This result is consistent with our ﬁnding, though
much like Fan and White, their analysis suﬀers from country-speciﬁc eﬀects.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we brieﬂy describe the bankruptcy
law in the U.S., its link to entrepreneurship, and data unsecured debt and debt-income ratio in
the population. Section 3 presents the model economy. Section 4 parameterizes the model and
Section 5 discusses the benchmark results. Section 6 conducts the quantitative analysis using the
parameterized version of the model. Section 7 considers the importance of entrepreneurship for
bankruptcy analysis. Section8 concludes.
2 Consumer bankruptcy law and entrepreneurship
Bankruptcy law In many countries, households can declare bankruptcy on their unsecured debts,
such as credit card debts. In the U.S., for example, households can choose either to ﬁle under Chapter
7, “total liquidation” or Chapter 13, “payout plan”.5 Chapter 7 fully discharges the unsecured debts,
but requires household debtors to give up all assets above an exemption level. Future earnings of
debtors are exempt from the obligation to repay. This is known as the “fresh start” in bankruptcy.
Filing under Chapter 7 precludes the debtor from declaring bankruptcy under Chapter 7 for six
4Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2000) provides an excellent review of the empirical literature.
5The equivalent of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 in Canada are the “Straight Bankruptcy” and the “Consumer Proposal”
respectively.
4years. Most bankruptcy ﬁlings (about 70% of total) are done under Chapter 7.
Under Chapter 13, debtors do not receive any immediate discharge of their unsecured debts.
Instead they must propose a plan to use some of their future earnings to repay part of or all their
unsecured debt over 3 to 5 years while keeping all their assets. If they respect this rescheduling plan
the remaining unsecured debts are fully discharged. This procedure is generally less favorable to
households (such as business owners) than Chapter 7 because often they do not have any nonexempt
assets. This may explain why most bankruptcy ﬁlings are done under Chapter 7. Since Chapter 7
is the most preferred bankruptcy procedure by households, we therefore model incentives to ﬁle for
personal bankruptcy as a decision under Chapter 7.
Although the bankruptcy law is uniform across the U.S., bankruptcy exemptions are set by the
states and vary widely. A bankruptcy exemption is the level of household assets that a debtor
declaring bankruptcy can keep. Most states have several types of exemptions: for equity in owner-
occupied housing (the homestead exemption), for equity in cars, for cash, and for various types of
goods. In most states, the homestead is the largest, and other exemptions are small.
Causes of bankruptcy Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) study a survey of bankrupt
households in 1991 where they asked these debtors the reasons for their bankruptcy. They ﬁnd that
67.5% of bankrupt debtors identify job loss (particularly, unemployment or personal business failure)
as the main cause of bankruptcy.6 Hence, anything, such as business failure, that causes household
income to fall exposes them to the risk for bankruptcy ﬁlings. The next two immediate reported
causes of personal bankruptcy are family (divorce, unexpected children) and medical problems. Other
sources are for example, credit problem and housing diﬃculties.
Entrepreneurs in bankruptcy Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989) show that a substantial
fraction of bankrupts are entrepreneurs. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that 20% were either entrepreneurs
at the time of ﬁling or had been entrepreneurs before they ﬁled for bankruptcy. Given that the
fraction of entrepreneurs in the population is lower than the fraction of entrepreneurs in bankruptcy,
entrepreneurs are over-represented in bankruptcy so that they are about twice more likely to be
bankrupt than workers. A key feature of entrepreneurs in bankruptcy is that they typically have
extremely high debt levels, with particularly high levels of unsecured debt although they represent
only 20% of all bankrupt debtors. Entrepreneurs account for more than half of the total unsecured
debt. This is illustrated in Table 1 which presents the balance sheets of entrepreneurs and workers
(non-entrepreneurs) in bankruptcy. The table shows that entrepreneurs have not only higher assets
than workers, but also higher debts (secured and unsecured debts) than workers. For example, the
mean of unsecured debts for entrepreneurs is almost $40,000 for entrepreneurs and only just less
than $10,000 for workers.
Entrepreneurs are more heavily burdened by debts. This is shown in Table 2 which presents
debt-income ratios of workers and entrepreneurs. The average debt-income ratio of entrepreneurs is
7.1 which implies that a typical entrepreneur debtor in bankruptcy would owe debts greater than
6Multiple responses were permitted during the survey.
5Table 1: Distribution of Debts and Assets for En-
trepreneurs and Workers in Bankruptcy
Total Unsecured Secured
Debt Debt Debts Assets
Entrepreneurs
Mean $85,824 $38,087 $47,897 $55,434
25th percentile 24,931 7,966 6,362 8,985
Median 53,193 19,039 25,976 40,592
75th percentile 109,899 46,305 59,000 71,727
Workers
Mean $26,753 $9,827 $16,850 $22,835
25th percentile 8,715 3,475 2,068 2,196
Median 16,953 6,063 8,010 10,595
75th percentile 35,750 10,577 25,275 37,942
Source: Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook (1989), Table 6.1.
seven years’ income. By contrast, a typical worker would owe debts equal to less than three years’
income—i.e., debt-income ratio equal to 2.5.




25th percentile 1.4 0.7
Median 2.7 1.3
75th percentile 7.5 2.3
Source: Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook (1989), Table 6.2.
Unsecured debts by occupation So far we have reported information on entrepreneurs and
workers in the bankruptcy sample. It is also important to have know the amount of unsecured debt
and debt income ratio in the economy in a non-bankruptcy data set. To do so, we use the Survey of
Consumer Finance of 2001 to present average amount of unsecured debt and the debt-income-ratio
of entrepreneurs and workers. The results are reported in Table 3. There are a few things to note
from the table. First, entrepreneurs have higher debt-income ratio than workers. Put diﬀerently,
entrepreneurs owe on average more than seven years of income in unsecured debts while workers owe
just ﬁve years of income. Second, entrepreneurs hold more that 30% of total unsecured debt and
their unsecured debt is almost three and half times the unsecured debts of workers.
6Table 3: Unsecured debts and Debt-Income Ratios for Entrepreneurs
and Workers in the SCF
Entrepreneurs Workers
Unsecured debt to income ratio 7.14 5.14
Unsecured debt $10,009 $3,034
Fraction of Unsecured debt 31.03% 69.97%
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 2001.
There is also indirect evidence (not from the SCF) that suggests that entrepreneurs use credit
cards to ﬁnance their businesses. In 1998 a study from Arthur Anderson reported in Sullivan, Warren,
and Westbrook (2000) argue that 47% of small businesses use credit cards to ﬁnance investment.
The eﬀects of bankruptcy law on entrepreneurship Entrepreneurs beneﬁt from higher per-
sonal bankruptcy exemptions because exemptions provide partial wealth insurance, but at the cost
of a reduction in credit availability (credit rationing and higher interest rate) as the exemption level
rises. Using the family-level panel data, Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and
the variation of bankruptcy exemptions across states, Fan and White (2003) investigate whether
households are more likely to become entrepreneurs if they live in states with higher homestead ex-
emptions. They ﬁnd that households who are homeowners are about 35% more likely to be business
owners if they live in states with unlimited exemption—hence, the wealth insurance eﬀect of home-
stead exemptions encourages business ownership. Moreover, Berkowitz and White (2004), using the
1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF), ﬁnd that small ﬁrms are more likely to be
denied credit if they are located in states with unlimited homestead exemptions than low homestead
exemptions, and that even when they receive the loan, the loans are on average smaller and lending
rates are higher. Armour and Cumming (2005) provide cross-country evidence and show that the
tighter is the personal bankruptcy law the lower is the self-employment rate across countries.
3 Model economy
The model is similar to Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and R´ ıos-Rull (2007) and Livshits, MacGee,
and Tertilt (2006) and the main diﬀerence is that entrepreneurial activity is explicitly modelled.
Speciﬁcally, the key characteristics are as follows: ﬁrst, the model features a bankruptcy choice
as well as an entrepreneurial choice. Second, there are two sources of idiosyncratic uncertainty:
uninsurable idiosyncratic investment risks and earnings risks. There is no aggregate uncertainty.
3.1 Preferences
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals who live for J peri-




















where β > 0 is the intertemporal discount factor, σ > 1 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, cj
is the consumption good at age j, and sj > 0 is an exogenous parameter that captures the evolution
of family sizes over the life-cycle. The introduction of the family size over the life-cycle is important
for explaining the hump-shaped life-cycle proﬁle of consumption (Attanasio and Rios-Rull (1999)).
3.2 Endowments and stochastic processes
In each period, age-j agents are endowed with earnings y(ε,j) = yjε, where yj is the deterministic
average life-cycle proﬁle of earnings and ε ∈ E = {ε1,...,εNε} is an idiosyncratic earnings shock. The
shock ε is observed at the beginning of the period and follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process with a
transition probability Qε (ε0,ε).7 The shock received by age-1 agents are drawn from the stationary
distribution Q∗
ε(ε).
Every period, each age-j household can run a risky technology that returns, G(k,η), in the next
period with capital input k. The variable η is an idiosyncratic business shock that is unknown when k




, follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process with a transition probability,
Qη (η0,η). Age-1 agents draw η from the invariant distribution Q∗
η(η) of Qη. We assume that there
is a minimum size of business k. We call households that decide to run the risky technology with
k ≥ k entrepreneurs and the remaining of the population workers. The gross return, G, is given by
the following equation:
G(η,k) = ηkν + (1 − δ)k. (2)
The ﬁrst component is the output produced and ν < 1 is the return-to-scale parameter. The
second component is the non-depreciated capital, where δ is the depreciation rate.
3.3 Financial intermediation
There is a competitive intermediation sector that processes all borrowing and lending. The return
on savings s ≥ 0 is given by the risk-free rate r∗. Household can borrow unsecured debts (d ≥ 0),
that is non-collateralized debts, such as credit cards loans. When making loans to households,
ﬁnancial intermediaries incur transaction cost φ per unit of loan. Individuals can declare bankruptcy
on unsecured debts. Following Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and R´ ıos-Rull (2007) and Livshits,
MacGee, and Tertilt (2006), we assume that ﬁnancial intermediaries charge individual-speciﬁc prices
on unsecured debts to capture the type-speciﬁc risk of bankruptcy. The underlying assumption is
that, when making unsecured loans to a household, intermediaries observe the level of total unsecured
loans, the business investments, the current earnings shock, the current business shock, and the
age of the borrower. As a result, the price of the unsecured debt charged to a household with a
7All variables denoted by prime (’) refer to next period variables.
8portfolio P = (s,k,d), shocks, x = (ε,η), and age, j, is given by qd (s,k,d,ε,η,j) which in turn
leads to an endogenous borrowing limit. The corresponding gross interest rate of this unsecured loan
is Rd (s,k,d,ε,η,j) = 1/qd (s,k,d,ε,η,j). Because of perfect competition ﬁnancial intermediaries
make zero proﬁt on unsecured loans made to each type of households. This implies there is no cross
subsidization of interest rates across diﬀerent types of borrowers. Let us deﬁne Λ(x,P0,j) to be the
probability that an age-j household with next period portfolio, P0 = (s0,k0,d0), and current shocks,
x, will ﬁle for bankruptcy in the next period. The zero proﬁt condition on unsecured loans to each
type of household borrower implies the following expression:
qd (P0,x,j) = [1 − Λ(P0,x,j)]qd (3)
+ Λ(P0,x,j)E

max{s0 + G(η0,k0) − χ,0}
d0 |b = 1

qd
where qd = 1
1+r∗+φ is the price of unsecured loans when the probability of default is zero, χ is the
government speciﬁed bankruptcy exemption, and Λ is the probability of default (which is deﬁned in
the equilibrium). The variable b ∈ {0,1} represents the decision of whether to declare bankruptcy or
not. Note that the deﬁnition of the price of qd takes into account how much ﬁnancial intermediaries
can collect when individuals declare bankruptcy. This is explained below in section 3.4.
3.4 Bankruptcy provisions
Households can declare bankruptcy on their unsecured debts. Bankruptcy in the model will be
similar to U.S. Chapter 7 fresh start provision.8 Filing for bankruptcy leads to a full discharge of
unsecured debt d of the household borrower. The household must, however, give up any assets in
excess of a speciﬁed bankruptcy exemption level, χ, to the creditor. More speciﬁcally, the amount
of asset that a household with a business of size, k, a business shock, η, and savings, s, can keep in
bankruptcy is given by the following expression:
min{G(η,k) + s,χ}, (4)
where the ﬁrst term represents business income plus savings.
In addition to losing non-exempted assets a bankrupt household is also subject to the following
punishment. The bankrupt households lose a fraction λ of their current labor income. The parameter
λ summarizes all non-exemption costs associated with bankruptcy ﬁling: (i) the stigma cost, (ii) the
pecuniary costs of a bad credit rating, and (iii) the exclusion from the credit market.
We end this section by assuming that a household cannot die with debts or assets. Therefore at
age J we have the following: d = 0, s = 0, and k = 0.
8In the U.S. households can also ﬁle under Chapter 13. Contrary to Chapter 7, ﬁling under Chapter 13 does not
discharge all unsecured debts, instead the debts are rescheduled. In the U.S., however, around 70% of all bankruptcy
ﬁlings occur under Chapter 7.
93.5 Timing of events
It is convenient to deﬁne a ≡ s+G(η,k)−d+y (ε,j) as the resources at hand after the bankruptcy
decision. The timing of events within a period is as follows. At the beginning of the period, house-
holds observe the earnings and business shocks, x = (ε,η). Given shocks, x, and the beginning-of-
period composition of the household’s portfolio, P = (s,k,d), the agent decides whether to declare
bankruptcy or not. If the household declares bankruptcy, the non-exempted assets are seized by the
creditor, a fraction, λ, of current labor income is lost, and all unsecured debts are fully discharged.
Bankrupt households and non-bankrupt households diﬀer mainly in their debt or asset position.
Households choose their current consumption, savings, borrowing, and business investments deci-


















3.6 The individual’s decision problem
We deﬁne Vj(x,a) to be the post-bankruptcy decision value function of an age-j household with
current shocks, x = (ε,η), and debt, d. Similarly, deﬁne Wj(x,P,a) as the pre-bankruptcy decision
value function of an age-j household whose beginning-of-period shocks are x and beginning-of-period
portfolio is P. We assume that the value function at age J + 1 is VJ+1(·) = 0.
The pre-bankruptcy decision value function of an age-j individual is given by








s + G(η,k) − d + y (ε,j) if b = 0
min{s + G(η,k),χ} + (1 − λ)y (ε,j) if b = 1
(6)
10If the household chooses not to declare bankruptcy (b = 0), then his or her post-bankruptcy
decision asset level is given by saving, plus business income, minus debt and plus labor income. If
the household chooses to declare bankruptcy (b = 1) his or her asset level is the exempted assets
plus labor income net of bankruptcy costs.
The post-bankruptcy decision value function is deﬁned as follows:










1 + r∗ + k0 − qd (s0,k0,d0,ε,η,j)d0 = a. (8)
c,d0,s0 ≥ 0, and k0 ≥ k or k0 = 0. (9)
Equation (8) is the budget constraint. On the right hand side of the budget constraint are assets
(or resources at hand), a. On the left hand side of the budget constraint, c is the current consumption,
s0 is savings with the price q∗ = 1/(1 + r∗), d0 is unsecured loans with the price function qd(x,P0,j)
deﬁned in equation (3), and k0 is business investments for the next period. If k0 = 0, the household
chooses to become a worker in the next period and if k0 ≥ k the household becomes an entrepreneur.
Equation (9) presents the lower limits on the choice variables.
3.7 Equilibrium
We are now ready to deﬁne the competitive equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 Given the risk-free bond price, q∗ and the bankruptcy exemption, χ, a recursive com-
petitive equilibrium is a set of value functions, V (·) and W(·), and a set of policy functions, s(·), d(·),
k(·), c(·), and b(·), an unsecured debt price function, qd(·), and a probability of declaring bankruptcy,
Λ(x,P0,j) such that
1. V (·) and W(·) solve the household problem, and s(·), d(·), k(·), c(·), and b(·) are the associated
decision rules;
2. The unsecured debt price function, qd(·) is obtained by the zero proﬁt conditions for ﬁnancial
intermediaries in equation (3);


















To obtain numerical solutions and conduct policy analysis, we need to choose particular values for
the parameters of the model economy. The parameters to be calibrated are related to the households
preferences, the stochastic process for labor eﬃciency, the stochastic process of business income,
technology in the entrepreneurial sector, technology in the intermediation sector, and the bankruptcy
system.
4.1 Demographics
We choose the model period to be 5 years. Agents start their life at age 20 and die at age 80 with 12
periods (J = 12). The annual population growth rate is 0.01 (n = 1.015 − 1). The life-cycle proﬁle
of family size sj, is calculated by multiplying the reciprocal of the average family size of each age
group from 2001 SCF, j, by the family equivalence scale given by Nelson (1993).
4.2 Preferences
The preference parameters include the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, σ, and the discount factor,
β. The relative risk aversion parameter, σ, is set 2.0. This number is in the range of estimates
suggested by Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) and Prescott (1986). The annual discount factor is set
0.96 so that β = 0.965.
4.3 Labor ability
The average age-proﬁle of earnings yj is taken from Hansen (1993) and adjusted for social security.
The persistent idiosyncratic shock, ε, is assumed to follow a four-state Markov process with transition
probability Qε. To calibrate Qε, it is assumed that the logarithm of the household’s labor earnings
follows a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process:
ln(εt+1) = ρε ln(εt) + ξt+1, ξt+1 ∼ N(0,σ2
ξ). (11)
Following Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2006) we
set annual the value of ρε = 0.99 and σ2
ξ = 0.016. To convert these values into the ﬁve year period
we assume that: ρε = 0.995 and σ2
ξ =
 






Given (ρε,σξ), the procedure described in Tauchen and Hussey (1991) is used to approximate
the above autoregression by a four-state Markov chain.
4.4 Intermediation technology
Two parameters need to be set in this section: the exogenous risk-free rate, r∗, and the transaction
cost parameter,φ. The annual risk-free rate is set equal to 4%, which is the average return on
capital reported by McGrattan and Prescott (2000). The risk-free rate for a ﬁve year period is thus
r∗ = (1.04)5 − 1 = 21.67%. The transaction costs are calibrated to match the observed interest rate
spread between secured and unsecured debt. Following Athreya (2004), the annual transaction cost
12on unsecured borrowing are 6.4%. The ﬁve-year interest rate on unsecured borrowing is (1.104)5−1 =
64%. This implies that the transaction cost for the ﬁve-year period is the diﬀerence between the
ﬁve-year borrowing rate and the ﬁve-year risk free rate: φ = 64% − 21.67% = 42.33%.
4.5 Business technology
There are three parameters to be set in this section: the returns-to-scale parameter, ν, the minimum
business size k, and the depreciation rate, δ. Following Cagetti and de Nardi (2006), we set ν to 0.7.
The minimum size is set to match the fraction of entrepreneurs in the data. Using the 2001 Survey
of Consumer Finance the fraction of population that is business owner is 12%. This number ranges
between 8% and 18% (see Gentry and Hubbard (2000) and Quadrini (1999)). Finally, the annual
depreciation rate is set to δ = 0.062.
4.6 Bankruptcy law
The bankruptcy law in this economy is characterized by two parameters: the bankruptcy exemption,
χ, and the bankruptcy cost of ﬁling, λ. In the U.S., while bankruptcy is a matter of federal law
and the procedure is uniform across the country, Congress gave the states the right to set their own
bankruptcy exemption levels, and these vary widely. Most states have several type of exemptions
which can be broadly classiﬁed into two groups: the homestead exemption and the non-homestead
exemption. The homestead exemption is the exemption on the equity in owner-occupied principal
residence. The non-homestead exemption is: for equity in cars, for cash, and for various types of
goods (furniture, clothing, cooking utensils, farm implements, family bibles, and tools for trade, etc).
In most states, the homestead exemption is the largest, and the non-homestead exemption is small.
In the U.S. the average national homestead bankruptcy is $25,000 and while the non-homestead
exemption is $6,797 in 1994. In the model, we will consider bankruptcy exemption as the sum of
both homestead and non-homestead exemptions. In the U.S., the average annual earnings is about
$58,000 in 1994. The annual mean total bankruptcy exemption to mean earnings ratio is 0.79.
Normalizing mean earnings to unity implies that χ = 0.158 = 0.79 ÷ 5.
The parameter, λ, is calibrated to match the overall bankruptcy rate. Fay, Hurst, and White
(2002) report that the national bankruptcy rate varies between 0.33 percent and 0.88 percent over
the period 1984-1995. The targeted annual bankruptcy rate in the model is chosen to 0.88. The
bankruptcy rate for the ﬁve year period is obtained by multiplying the annual bankruptcy rate by
ﬁve.
The bankruptcy rate of entrepreneurs is obtained by using (i) the fact that 20% of bankrupts
are entrepreneurs (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000)), (ii) the fraction of entrepreneurs in the
economy (12%) and (iii) the overall bankruptcy rate. The bankruptcy rate of entrepreneurs is given
by 0.20 times the overall bankruptcy rate and divided by the measure of entrepreneurs.
134.7 Stochastic process of business shocks
We assume that the transition probability function, Qη, of the business shock is a four-state discrete
approximation, ` a la Tauchen and Hussey (1991), to an AR(1):
lnηt = (1 − ρη)µη + ρη lnηt−1 + ζt, with ζt ∼ N(0,σ2
ζ). (12)
Q∗
η is the invariant distribution of the transition matrix Qη. We have four parameters (λ,k,µη,σζ)
that are set endogenously to match the following ﬁve targets in equilibrium: (1) the fraction of
entrepreneurs in the population, 12 percent, where entrepreneurs are deﬁned as business owners who
have active management in the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances. (2) The fraction of bankrupt
households that are entrepreneurs. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989) report that 20 percent
of bankrupt households are entrepreneurs. (3) The overall ﬁve-year bankruptcy rate of 4.4 percent.
(4) The entrepreneurs’ income to workers’ income ratio is 2.72 in the 2001 SCF. The annual values
for the targets are summarized in Table 4
Table 4: Moments Targeted in the Benchmark in Annual Values
Moment Values Source
Fraction of Entrepreneurs 12% SCF (2001)
Fraction of bankrupts that are entrepreneurs 20% Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989)
Overall annual bankruptcy rate 0.88% Athreya (2004)
Entrepreneurs’income to workers’ income 2.72 SCF(2001)
The ﬁxed parameters and the endogenously set parameters (λ,k,µη,σζ,ρη) are listed in Table 5.
Table 5: Calibrated Parameters of the Benchmark Economy
Parameters Values
Fixed parameters
σ Relative risk aversion 2
β Discount factor 0.815
J Lifetime 12
ν Degree of return to scale 0.700
ρε Coeﬃcient of autocorrelation of labor income 0.951
σ
2
ξ Annual variance of labor income 0.007
r
∗ Risk-free rate (%) 21.67
φ Annual transaction costs on unsecured debt 0.064
χ Bankruptcy exemption 0.158
Endogenously calibrated parameters
µη Average business shock 0.224
σζ Standard deviation of business shock 0.657
ρη Coeﬃcient of autocorrelation of business shocks —
k Minimum business size 1.273
λ Bankruptcy punishment 0.466
145 Benchmark results and properties of model
In this section, we present the calibration results and the properties of the model. Table 6 reports
the target statistics and the implied results from the model. The table shows that, the model
matches relatively well the targets. For example, in the data the overall annual bankruptcy rate
and the fraction of entrepreneurs are 0.88% and 12% respectively; the model obtains 0.89% and 12%
respectively for these variables.
Table 6: Moments Targeted in the Benchmark in Annual Values
Moment Targets Model
Fraction of Entrepreneurs (%) 12.00 12.00
Overall annual bankruptcy rate (%) 0.88 0.89
Entrepreneur annual bankruptcy rate (%) 1.467 1.49
Entrepreneurs’income to workers’ income 2.72 2.60
Our model economy provides attractive implications by occupational status. Table 7 presents
debt and bankruptcy statistics for entrepreneurs and workers. With the exception of the bankruptcy
rate of entrepreneurs, the statistics in this table are not targeted, they are implied by the model.
Therefore, they provide an additional way to gauge the success of our model in terms of being
consistent with the data. Several key results emerge from the table. First, it is apparent from the
table that entrepreneurs account for most of the debts in bankruptcy. This is consistent with the
stylized facts of Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) that we reported in Table 1. Entrepreneurs
account for about 60% of total debt in default. Put it diﬀerently, the amount of debt defaulted of
entrepreneurs is more than six times the amount of debt discharged of workers. This is explained
by the fact that entrepreneurship is risky and business owners borrow a large amount of funds
for entrepreneurial activity. Second, entrepreneurs account for more than 30% of total debts in
the economy. Third, the average interest rate among workers, which is weighted by the number
of workers, is lower than that among entrepreneurs. This is justiﬁed by the fact that the default
premium for entrepreneurs is on average higher than that for worker since entrepreneurs face greater
default risks.
Properties of loan interest rates Figure 5 shows the interest rate schedule of entrepreneurs
and workers as a function of the debt (d) to asset (k + s)ratio. There is not a unique interest rate
for an individual household, it is a function of the amount of debt, portfolio, and household’s type.
For illustration, we report the interest rate schedule for low η, middle-aged households and medium
earnings shock ε and ﬁxed asset at (k + s = 1.5). On the ﬁgure, blue and green lines represent
entrepreneurs (k > 0) and workers (k = 0) respectively. There are a few points to note. First, the
loan interest rate schedule is increasing with debt to asset ratio. The higher is the debt level, the
more vulnerable are households to ﬂuctuations in income which in turn increases the default rate.
15Table 7: Bankruptcy, Debt and Loan Interest Rates for Entrepreneurs
and Workers in the Benchmark Economoy
Entrepreneurs Workers Ratio Entrep.
to Workers
Annual bankruptcy rate (%) 1.490 0.726 2.1
Average debt 1.51 0.47 3.2
Average amount of debt defaulted 0.13 0.0199 6.5
Average annual borrowing interest rate (%) 11.12 10.07 1.1
Fraction of total debt held 30.46% 69.54%
Fraction of total debt defaulted 64.64% 35.36%
Second, for higher debt to asset ratios, the loan interest rate schedule for entrepreneurs is above that
for workers. This is because business and earnings shocks are persistent and the default rate among
entrepreneurs is much higher than that among workers.
Figure 2 reports the interest rate schedule for diﬀerent levels of business productivity η. As can
be seen from the ﬁgure, the interest rate schedule is lower when business productivity is higher.
Given the persistent nature of the business productivity shock, the probability of default decreases
with business productivity.
Our benchmark economy features several interesting life-cycle results. We deﬁne young, middle-
aged, and old as households of age less than 35, between 36 and 65, and above 65 respectively. As can
be seen from panel A of Table 8, the model does relatively a good job of matching the hump-shape
of bankruptcy rate over the life-cycle.9
The second panel also shows that the number of entrepreneurs replicates the age-proﬁle of en-
trepreneurship. This is due to the fact the presence of ﬁnancial constraints and the cost of external
ﬁnancing makes wealth holding an important element for starting a business. Young agents have not
time to accumulate enough wealth while middle-age households and old have accumulated assets to
become entrepreneurs.











9The bankruptcy rates over the life-cycle in data are from Table A4 in Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000).
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Figure 1: Loan Interest Rates for an Entrepreneur and a Worker
To summarize this section, in our framework:
• Entrepreneurial households are more likely to ﬁle for personal bankruptcy than non-entrepreneurs
(workers). This pattern holds not only for the overall economy but also within age groups.
• Although, entrepreneurs represent 20% of all bankrupts households they account for 60% of all
debts in bankruptcy.
• Entrepreneurs account for a signiﬁcant fraction of all consumer debt. More speciﬁcally, they
hold 30% of total debts.
6 Policy experiments
In this section we use our model to study the economic consequences of changes in bankruptcy
regulation that seek to tighten bankruptcy rules under Chapter 7. We consider two bankruptcy
regulations:
1. The reduction of bankruptcy asset exemptions. Lowering asset exemptions is an element of the
bankruptcy reform that has been approved by President Bush (Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005).












Annual Interest Rate Schedule, Baseline







Figure 2: Loan Interest Rates for an Entrepreneur with Diﬀerent Business Productivity
2. The full elimination of the personal bankruptcy system. This policy eliminates the partial
insurance coming from full discharge of unsecured debt as well as the insurance coming from
the exemptions.
6.1 The elimination of bankruptcy exemptions
In this section we present the eﬀects of our ﬁrst policy, a tightening of bankruptcy rules under
Chapter 7 that eliminates the asset exemption (χ = 0). With the exemption eliminated, the only
beneﬁt that remains from ﬁling for bankruptcy is the insurance that comes from the discharge of
debt.
Before discussing, we present qualitatively the diﬀerent eﬀects arising from reducing bankruptcy
exemptions. Reducing exemptions leads to the following eﬀects. First, a lower exemption implies
greater conﬁscation of assets, and at the margin less beneﬁt from ﬁling for bankruptcy. This ef-
fect tends to decrease bankruptcy ﬁlings. Second, a lower exemption reduces the partial insurance
provided by the presence of exemption. This tends to discourage entrepreneurial activity. Third,
because more assets are conﬁscated in bankruptcy, a lower exemption reduces incentives to save and
to accumulate capital. Finally, because the creditor can conﬁscate more assets in the event of default,
and because the incentive to default decreases, the interest rate charged to the individual falls. This
tends to (i) increase unsecured borrowing and (ii) encourage entrepreneurial activity to the extent
that entrepreneurs’ ﬁnancial constraints are relaxed.
186.1.1 Aggregate eﬀects and welfare implications
Table 9 reports the implications of eliminating the bankruptcy exemption on entrepreneurship, the
overall bankruptcy rate, the amount of debt, the average borrowing interest rate, and welfare.
Bankruptcy, entrepreneurship and debts It is apparent from the table that the elimination
of the bankruptcy exemption generates the expected results regarding bankruptcy ﬁlings. Indeed,
the bankruptcy rate is much lower after the reform and falls by about 33%.
Table 9: The Eﬀects of Eliminating Bankruptcy Asset Exemptions
Baseline No Exemptions Change
(%)
Fraction of entrepreneurs (%) 12.00 12.68 5.7
Bankruptcy rate (%) 0.892 0.602 -32.5
Average annual borrowing interest rate (%) 10.65 10.55 -2.4
Average unsecured debt 0.68 0.91 34.3
Amount of debt defaulted 0.044 0.031 -29.4
Total business capital per entrepreneurs 1.34 1.37 2.2
Welfare (equivalence consumption variation %) 1.78
The table also shows that the number of entrepreneurs increases after eliminating the bankruptcy
exemption. To understand this result, recall that the bankruptcy exemption has two opposite eﬀects
on entrepreneurship. On one hand, bankruptcy provides partial insurance against business failure
and thus encourages entrepreneurial activity. One the other hand, a direct consequence of this partial
insurance is an increase in the default rate. To compensate for this high default risk, the ﬁnancial
intermediary charges a higher premium. This high borrowing rate tightens borrowing constraints of
entrepreneurs and tends to discourage entrepreneurship. The change in entrepreneurial activity is
the net eﬀect of these two opposing forces: the partial insurance and credit supply eﬀects. As the
table shows, the average borrowing rate drops substantially after the reform (since the default rate
falls) and the number of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial investments increase. This suggests that
the increase in entrepreneurial activity comes from the credit supply eﬀect.
Because of the lower borrowing rate, the amount of debt increases signiﬁcantly. In fact, it increases
by more than 34%. Despite a large increase in the amount of debt held, the average amount of debt
defaulted decreases substantially. The decrease in the amount of debt discharge falls by almost 30%.
Welfare implications Our measure of welfare is the ex ante expected lifetime utility of a newborn
agent with zero asset in our economy. To describe welfare, we will report the equivalent consumption
variation (ECV), which is the percentage increase in lifetime consumption required to compensate
19for the diﬀerence in welfare between the two policy regimes. A positive number means that the new
policy regime is a better regime under the welfare criteria.
The second panel of Table 9 shows that the elimination of the bankruptcy exemption leads to a
signiﬁcant welfare gain of 1.78% of lifetime consumption. The welfare gain stems from the decrease
in the borrowing rate which not only allows for better consumption smoothing over the life-cycle
but also increases entrepreneurial activity by relaxing their ﬁnancial constraints. Another factor
that contributes to the improvement in welfare is that the removal of bankruptcy asset exemption
eliminates relatively bad projects with high business risk that were undertaken because of the par-
tial insurance coming from the exemption. This improvement in welfare suggests that tightening
bankruptcy rule through exemption reductions is desirable. This result is consistent with Li and
Sarte (2006).
6.1.2 Aggregate eﬀects by occupation
Table 10 presents statistics for entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. The table shows that taking
away the bankruptcy exemption reduces bankruptcy rates among both entrepreneurs and workers,
though more so among entrepreneurs. More speciﬁcally, the bankruptcy rate among entrepreneurs
decreases by almost 40%, while the rate among workers falls by about 30%. The decrease in the
bankruptcy rate is larger among entrepreneurs because of the following eﬀects: (i) with less insurance
the quality of start-up businesses is higher for a given wealth holdings of entrepreneurs and thus
relatively less risky on average, and (ii) a higher fraction of individuals with relatively high wealth,
who will thus need to borrow less, enter entrepreneurship since there is less insurance in case of
business failure. Note that, despite the fact that the default rate of entrepreneurs decreases more
after the reform, it is still higher than the default rate of workers. This is not surprising since
entrepreneurs are on average subject to greater risks and carry more debts than workers.10 With the
default rate decreasing more among entrepreneurs than among workers, the average interest rates
faced by entrepreneurs decrease by more than those facing workers. In fact, the average interest rate
of workers decreases only modestly. The table also shows that the amount of debt defaulted falls
for both entrepreneurs and workers, though less dramatically for workers. Moreover, the amount
of debt carried by entrepreneurs rises less than the one of workers. This comes from the fact that
entrepreneurs rely relatively less on borrowing.
6.1.3 Life-cycle eﬀects
We present default rates, the fraction of entrepreneurs, and the amount of debt over the life-cycle after
the policy change. The ﬁrst panel of Table 11 shows that bankruptcy rates retain their hump shaped
proﬁle, though with a decrease in bankruptcy ﬁling for each age group. The decrease in bankruptcy
rates is largest for the eldest cohort. This is because, without exemptions, all the accumulated
savings of the old will be conﬁscated by the ﬁnancial intermediary if they default.
10Given that the quality of business increases after the reform, this means that the optimal size of business increases
and as a result entrepreneurs will prefer a lower interest borrowing rate.
20Table 10: The Eﬀects of Eliminating Bankruptcy Exemptions for En-
trepreneurs and Workers
Baseline No Exemptions Change
Bankruptcy rate (%)
Entrepreneur 1.49 0.862 -38.83%
Worker 0.726 0.484 33.33%
Average debt
Entrepreneur 1.51 1.58 4.12%
Worker 0.47 0.73 55.41%
Average amount of debt defaulted
Entrepreneur 0.13 0.08 -38.99%
Worker 0.0199 0.0165 -17.06%
Average annual borrowing interest rate (%)
Entrepreneur 11.12 10.65 -0.47
Worker 10.07 10.06 -0.01
The second panel of Table 11 shows that the number of entrepreneurs in each age group increases.
The number of young entrepreneurs increases by 10% while the number of middle-aged and old
entrepreneurs increases by 6% and 2% respectively. There is a larger increase in the number of young
entrepreneurs because young entrepreneurs were initially constrained. The reduction of borrowing
interest rates generated by lower default risk allows them to borrow to become entrepreneurs.
Table 12 presents the amount of debt and average interest rate by age cohort after the reform.
As expected, the amount of debt increases for each age cohort. The highest increase in debt is
for the youngest cohort, where the amount of debt after the reform more than double. This high
increase comes from the fact that the young were initially constrained and can now borrow at low
interest interest rates. These increases in the amount of debt are consistent with the decreases in
the borrowing interest rates for each age cohort.
6.2 The elimination of the personal bankruptcy system
This section analyzes the eﬀects of eliminating bankruptcy provisions entirely. This means that
there is no debt discharge nor any exemption and therefore the insurance against bad luck brought
by personal bankruptcy system is no longer present. In this new economy, households will borrow
up to the point they can pay back their debt with certainty.
Table 13 presents the implications of complete elimination of the personal bankruptcy system.
Because borrowers will pay back their debt with probability one, the ﬁnancial intermediary does not
charge any risk premium and therefore the average borrowing interest falls and it is just equal to
r∗ + φ = 10.4%. In contrast to the case where the bankruptcy exemption is eliminated, the table
shows that eliminating the entire consumer bankruptcy system considerably decreases the fraction of
21Table 11: The Eﬀects of Eliminating Bankruptcy Exemptions on
Bankruptcy and Entrepreneurship Rates over the Life-Cycle
Baseline No Exemptions Change
(%) (%) (%)
Bankruptcy rate
Young 1.52 0.898 -40.9
Middle 6.32 5.08 -19.7
Old 5.53 3.05 -44.9
Entrepreneurship rate
Young 6.17 6.799 10.2
Middle 19.06 20.261 6.3
Old 10.65 10.88 2.2
Table 12: The Eﬀects of Eliminating Bankruptcy Exemptions on Aver-
age Debt and Borrowing Interest Rate over the Life-Cycle
Baseline No Exemptions Change
(%) (%)
Average debt
Young 0.50 1.14 127.80%
Middle 0.81 0.98 20.60%
Old 0.85 0.90 6.20%
Average annual borrowing interest rate
Young 10.77 10.63 -0.14
Middle 10.56 10.51 -0.05
Old 10.59 10.49 -0.10
entrepreneurs. The fraction of entrepreneurs falls from 12% to 9.16%—that is, by nearly 24%. This
decrease in entrepreneurial activity comes mainly from the fact that the insurance oﬀered by both
the debt discharge and the exemption no longer exist. With entrepreneurship being risky, business
owners value this insurance even if such insurance increases the cost of of borrowing.
Another key result is that, taking away the whole bankruptcy system leads to a sizeable welfare
loss. Put diﬀerently, in this incomplete-market economy, the presence of the bankruptcy system is
desirable. The welfare loss of eliminating bankruptcy system is about 4.94% of life-time consumption.
This large welfare loss is due to the fact that (i) the beneﬁts of smoothing consumption across states
dominate the beneﬁts of the intertemporal consumption smoothing and (ii) the large decrease in
entrepreneurial activity. On the whole, the system’s insurance eﬀect thus dominates the credit
supply eﬀect.
Table 14 describes the eﬀects of removing the bankruptcy system on entrepreneurship and debt
holdings over the life-cycle. As can be seen from the table, the fraction of entrepreneurs decreases for
all three age groups. As in the the ﬁrst policy experiment, the change in the fraction of entrepreneurs
is largest for young individuals. Because these young agents have low wealth and low age proﬁle of
labour eﬃciency, they are more sensitive to policy changes.
22Table 13: The Eﬀects of Eliminating Bankruptcy System
Baseline No Bankruptcy Change
(%)
Fraction of entrepreneurs (%) 12.00 9.16 -23.7
Bankruptcy rate (%) 0.89 0.00 -100.0
Average annual borrowing interest rate (%) 10.65 10.40
Average unsecured debt 0.68 0.90 32.4
Amount of debt defaulted 0.044 0.00 -100.0
Welfare (equivalence consumption variation %) -4.94
Table 14: The Eﬀects of Eliminating Bankruptcy System over the Life-
Cycle
Baseline No Bankruptcy Change
(%)
Entrepreneurship rate (%)
Young 6.17 2.955 -52.1
Middle 19.06 16.18 -15.1
Old 10.65 9.276 -12.9
Average unsecured debt
Young 0.50 1.15 128.8
Middle 0.81 0.95 17.1
Old 0.85 0.88 2.9
7 Importance of entrepreneurship
A key point in this paper is that entrepreneurship plays an important role in understanding bankruptcy
options. To make this point, we will compare our two bankruptcy reforms in two diﬀerent economies:
one economy with entrepreneurs and another without entrepreneurs. We will contrast the eﬀects of
a given bankruptcy reform in the two economies in terms of the change in bankruptcy rates and the
welfare implications. We take away the occupational choice so that everybody is a worker. Table 15
summarizes the ﬁndings of these experiments.
Before discussing the implications of the policy reforms, it is important to note that the bankruptcy
rate is lower in the baseline economy without entrepreneurs than in the economy with entrepreneurs.
This is not surprising since in the economy with no entrepreneurs, the only source of uncertainty
responsible for default is earnings risk. In the economy with entrepreneurs, on the other hand, there
is an additional source of uncertainty: investment risk. In such an economy, with entrepreneurs
facing greater risks and taking on more debt to ﬁnance investments, the probability of default is
higher. This can be seen from Table 15 where the overall annual bankruptcy rate in the economy
with workers only is 0.776% while it is 0.88% in the model with entrepreneurs.
We now return to the policy experiments. It is apparent from the last two columns of Table 15
23that, entrepreneurship plays an important role in understanding bankruptcy regulations. The second
column shows that the elimination of the bankruptcy exemption still leads to an improvement welfare
in the model without entrepreneurs, but the improvement in welfare is relatively small. The reduction
in interest rates that comes from a lower default premium facilitates intertemporal smoothing of
consumption over the life-cycle. Finally, the last column illustrates that eliminating the entire
bankruptcy system leads to a welfare gain in the economy without entrepreneurs though it leads
to a welfare loss in the economy with entrepreneurs. However, this welfare gain is also relatively
small. This ﬁnding is in line with Athreya (2002). With no more investment risks in the economy
without entrepreneurs, the need to smooth consumption across states is less desirable.
Overall, the presence of entrepreneurship increases the welfare eﬀects of bankruptcy regulation.
Speciﬁcally, accounting explicitly for entrepreneurship makes the bankruptcy exemption less desirable
and the entire bankruptcy system more attractive. This suggests that accounting for entrepreneurship
is essential in consumer bankruptcy analysis.
Table 15: The Eﬀects of Eliminating Bankruptcy Exemptions and the
Bankruptcy System on Bankruptcy Rate and Welfare in Economies with
and without Entrepreneurs (in Percentage)
Baseline No Exemption No Bankruptcy
Without Entrepreneurs
Bankruptcy rate 0.776 0.576 0.00
Welfare (consumption equivalence) 0.024 0.081
With Entrepreneurs (baseline)
Bankruptcy rate 0.892 0.602 0.00
Welfare (consumption equivalence) 1.78 -4.96
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a quantitative model of consumer bankruptcy and entrepreneurship and
used it to assess the importance of the whole bankruptcy procedure and bankruptcy asset exemptions.
A key feature of the model is the presence of two types of uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty:
earnings risks and investment risks where entrepreneurs face both types of risks while workers face
only earnings risks. Because entrepreneurs are subject to an additional risk, their default probability
is higher on average than that of workers. Another key feature of the model is that interest rates on
consumer loans depend on observable individual characteristics (such as income, labor productivity
and business productivity) and the amount of consumer debt owed by the household.
We showed that eliminating bankruptcy asset exemptions leads to a modest increase in en-
trepreneurship, a large decrease in the overall bankruptcy rate, and an increase in the amount of
24debt. More importantly, this policy reform generates a signiﬁcant welfare gain. In contrast, elimi-
nating the entire bankruptcy system leads a sizeable welfare loss and a large decrease in the number
of entrepreneurs. The results of these two policy experiments provide a very important message: the
consumer bankruptcy system is desirable but it must be well designed in a way that carefully limits
asset exemptions.
A second key message from this paper is that entrepreneurial activity is important for quantita-
tively assessing the macroeconomic and welfare implications of bankruptcy regulations. For example,
in the model without entrepreneurs, the elimination of the entire consumer bankruptcy system gen-
erates a welfare gain (although small) though it leads to a large welfare loss when entrepreneurial
activity is explicitly modeled.
Our model can be extended in several important directions. An interesting extension is to take
into account durable goods (such as housing and cars). With housing, we would be able to study
diﬀerent types of exemptions in particular homestead exemption which is the largest exemption in
the data. Another interesting extension is to allow the coexistence of secured and unsecured debt as
a high fraction of consumer debts is secured (e.g., mortgages).
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